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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
PROPERTY SECURITY- A NEW SECURITY DEVICE
-THE WISCONSIN FACTOR'S LIEN LAW
With the enactment of the Factor's Lien Law in 1951,1 Wisconsin
became the twenty-second state to pass such legislation, the sixteenth
since the close of World War 11.2 The purpose of this article is to
examine the problem causing this rush to legislate together with an
analysis of the supposed answer to the problem.
I. THE PROBLEM INVOLVED
According to a survey made by the United States Department of
Commerce for the first quarter of 1946, 98.2 per cent of the business
in the United States employed less than 500 people, and could be classi-
fied as small business.3 Because small businesses are usually under-
capitalized, they must borrow, if at all, on a secured basis. In addition,
the 300,000 to 500,000 new businesses started each year are usually
pioneered by men with little or no business experience and also are
usually undercapitalized. Their credit problem too is based on a forced
secured borrowing with little or no security to offer. As these businesses
grow, they find themselves in continuously over-extended positions,
their fixed assets encumbered, their financial statements not providing
an adequate basis for the extension of credit, and their inventory so
small that it must be available for further processing or display on their
shelves for sale. However, the only security most of them have to offer
is this same inventory.
To extend credit on the basis of this security under the security
devices available in Wisconsin prior to the Factor's Lien Law was risky
if not impossible. The common law pledge with its requirement of
possession in the pledgee4 was of no utility in this situation. The use of
a chattel mortgage was also valueless unless it provided for including
additions to or replenishments of the stock. Such a mortgage, however,
has after acquired property features and Wisconsin early went on
record holding a mortgage on after acquired property a mere revocable
license in the mortgagee to take possession of the mortgaged property
when acquired by the mortgagor, provided the mortgage gave such
rights of entry and possession.5 A second difficulty with this type of
mortgage is that if any of the proceeds arising from the sale of the
I Wis. Laws (1951), ch. 486.
2H.R. Silve'man, Factoring; Its Legal Aspects and Economic Justification, 13
L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 593, 602 (1948).
3 Ibid., at p. 595.
4 Seymor v. Coburn, 43 Wis. 67 (1877); Beilfuss v. Corrigan, 95 Wis. 651(1897). Field warehousing suffers similar disadvantages, see note, 37 VA.
L. REV. 1023 (1951).
5 See Mietus, Chattel Mortgages on After Acquired Property, 23 MARQ. L.
REv. 80 (1939).
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mortgaged property are used for the mortgagor's benefit, the court will
hold it is fraudulent as to creditors as a matter of law.6
As early as 1887 the legislature recognized the 'stringency of the
above holdings on a mortgage on stock in trade, and created what is
today section 241.14 of the Wisconsin Statutes, allowing to a limited
extent such mortgages. While the decisions negativing clauses including
after acquired property provisions were thus attempted to be remedied
by legislation, no attempt was made to relieve the mortgagor from the
rule requiring him to account strictly for all theproceeds from the sale
of the mortgaged property, and to use none for his own purposes. In
addition to this defect, the legislative approval provided for the after
acquired property clauses was relatively ineffective due to the frequent
reports necessary to be filed (every four monhts) 7 and the lack of
control by the creditor over the filing of these reports but the require-
ment that he foreclose immediately should the debtor fail to file.8
The remaining chattel security device available in these situations in
Wisconsin is the conditional sale. While it does not suffer from such a
lack of judicial approval9 as the chattel mortgage on after acquired
property, its use provides little answer to the basic problem herein con-
sidered, i.e., where the borrower has an existing inventory. Its utility is
restricted to a simple purchase money device, and does not approach the
idea of a floating charge like the Factor's Lien.
In other jurisdictions a further security device is available, the use
of the trust receipt. However, Wisconsin does not have the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act, an act which is most nearly analogous to the
Factor's Lien Law in its recording requirements-the lender being
protected simply by the filing of a general statement of intent to enter.
trust receipt transactions instead of more cumbersome and inconvenient
separate recordation of each separate transaction as in the case of a
chattel mortgage.' 0 A general description of the kind of goods to be
covered is all that is required.'1 Once such a statement is filed, the
borrower and lender have only to enter agreements covering the specific
goods as the money is advanced to be protected under the act. Such
latter agreement need not be recorded. However, even under this act,
most courts have restricted its application to those situations where the
underlying transaction was the acquisition of new goods by the bor-
rower,' 2 and thus it would not aid a borrower who already has an
6 See comment, 1947 Wis. L. REv. 453.
7 WIs. STATS. (1951), sec. 241.14 (1).
8Ibid., 241.14 (2).
9 Wisconsin is one of the twelve states to enact the UNIFORM CONDITIONAL
SALES AcT, Wis. STATs. (1951), ch. 122.
20 UNIFoRM TRUST REcEIPTS AcT, sec. 13, 9 U.L.A. 372.
11 Ibid.
12 In re Chappel, 77 F.Supp. 573 (D.C. Ore., 1948).
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inventory on hand and desires to finance his operations rather than the
purchase price of his inventory.
These older security devices all show certain deficiencies rendering
their use difficult where the manufacturer has an inventory on hand
and wants to retain possession, process it, and sell it in the normal
course of business using the proceeds to repay loans and to buy new
raw materials so that processing may continue.
II. HISTORY OF FACTORING
It is beyond both the purpose and scope of this article to engage in
a detailed history of the commercial factor. Excellent discussions may
be found elsewhere. 13 Enough will be said, however, to give the
Wisconsin Factor's Lien Law its proper historical setting.
Factoring originally arose when the buyer and the seller were far
apart and the seller needed someone in this far off port to whom he
could consign his goods.14 The factor thus became the middleman agent
of the seller. 5 Often he advanced money to his principal' 6 or incurred
expenses in handling the goods before he sold them; where the account
between the factor and the principal indicated a balance due the factor,
he was given as security a general lien on the goods in his possession.1 7
Usually the lien depended upon physical possession of the goods by the
factor, 8 but in some cases the court sustained a lien based on con-
structive possession.' 9
As business conditions changed, factoring as a marketing device
diminished, but factoring as a financing device became more prom-
inent.2 0 However, since the factor could no longer rely on a possessory
lien, the factor had no adequate protection for his loan.2' Since most
factoring was done in the great ocean ports, the pressure for legislation
favorable to factors was felt there first. It was in this situation that
the New York act was passed in 1911,2 the purpose of which was to
give the agent-factor out of possession the same lien as if he were in
possession.
The lien created under the Wisconsin act is much broader than the
lien created by this first legislation, for the factor no longer is an agent;
he may be "any person, firm, bank or corporation engaged in whole or
'1 See Steffan and Danziger, The Rebirth of the Commercial Factor, 36 COL. L.
REv. 745 (1936).
142 MFECHEm, AGENCY, sec. 2496-97 (2nd ed. 1914); RESTATEMENT, SECURITY,
sec. 62, comment (d) (1941).
'
5 Supra, note 2.
16 Gilmore, Chattel Security; II, 57 YALE L. J., 761 (1948).
'7 RESTATEMENT, SECURITY, sec. 62 (a) ; 2 MEECHEM, supra, note 14, sec. 2563.282 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES 935 (rev. ed. 1940).
19 2 MEECHEM, supra, note 14, sec. 2563 n. 59.
20 Supra, note 13, at 761.
21 Johnson, The New York Factor and the Chandler Act A study in Competing
Equities, 10 BROOK L. REV. 323, 350 (1941).
22 NEW YORK PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW (McKinney, Supp. 1947) sec. 45.
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in part, in the business of lending or advancing money on the security.
of merchandise whether or not they are employed to sell such merchan-
dise."'23 This lien is totally different from the possessory agent's lien
of the common law factor.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE WISCONSIN ACT AND
CoMpARISON 24 WITH OTHER STATES
While almost half the states now have legislation on their books
covering financing by factors, the legislation is nowhere near being a
uniform act, and the individual state acts have been characterized as
being "models of bad drafting."2 However, a majority of the various
acts do show a similarity in their basic provisions to which the Wiscon-
sin Law can be compared.
In most states, including Wisconsin, a factor no longer is the agent
of the borrower, nor need he have authority to sell the merchandise.2 6
The continuing lien2" given the factor by the act is restricted in Wis-
consin, as in nine other states, to all merchandise other than trade
fixtures, machinery, and equipment (Wisconsin along with two other
states in addition excludes motor vehicles) generally described in the
written agreement entered into between the factor and the borrower;
twelve states have no merchandise restrictions whatsoever.
The lien provided for in the Wisconsin Act terminates on the sale of
the goods,2 nineteen states providing similarly; the lien, however, in
Wisconsin follows the proceeds of the sale unless provided otherwise in
the written agreement entered into between the factor and the bor-
rower. 9 Twelve states make provision for automatic transfer of the
lien to the proceeds of the sale, only Maryland and Delaware make the
transfer of the lien contingent upon the written agreement. Five states
have no provision at all covering the situation.
Wisconsin does not require a sign to be posted on the borrower's
premises giving notice of the existence of the lien. The states are evenly
split on this proposition. The effective period of the lien in Wisconsin
is limited to three years with a possibility of renewal for an additional
year.30 Five states in substance make similar provision, while fifteen
states have no time limitation whatsoever.
23 WIs. STATS. (1951), sec. 241.145 (1). Inasmuch as repeated reference -will
be made to the Wisconsin Act, further citation will be made to the section
number only.24 The comparison made is based on the excellent work of H.R. Silverman,
supra note 2. At page 602 appears a graphical collection of all the factor's
acts passed prior to the Wisconsin Act.
25 Supra, note 16, at 771.
26 Se. 241.145 (1)
27 Sec. 241.145 (2).
28 Sec. 241.145 (5).2 9 Sec. 241.145 (1)
30 Sec. 241.145 (8)
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In Wisconsin the notice of the lien must be filed with the register
of deeds in the county where the merchandise is to be located,31 a
provision found in twenty other states. Wisconsin, however, requires
no additional filing, while most other states require, in addition, notice
filed either at the borrower's location, or the factor's location, or botn.
The notice, to be valid in Wisconsin must be filed within fifteen days of
the agreement ;32 only five states have similar provisions, sixteen states
have no time limitation on the filing of the notice at all. The require-
ments concerning the contents of the notice and its formalization seem
to be in substance uniform in all the states, Wisconsin requiring the
notice to be signed by the factor and borrower 33 and contain a general
description of the merchandise to be covered by the agreement.34 The
effectiveness of the lien as against unsecured creditors, 5 the provision
for non-invalidation by certain acts,3 6 and the separate treatment of the
problem of possession of the merchandise by the factor without filing
the notice3 7 also seem to be quite uniform.
The above analysis and comparison of the Wisconsin Act with those
of the other states illustrates the fact that most of these acts, while not
uniform, are similar in their basic provisions. The Wisconsin Act is
most similar to the Minnesota Act,3 8 Minnesota being the twenty-first
state to enact such legislation.39 The Wisconsin Act, however, differs in
at least two respects from all other acts. Not only does a purchaser for
value in the ordinary course of the business take free of the factor's lien,
but the borrower is given the power to execute chattel mortgages and
conditional sales to purchasers in the usual course of business and can
sell or assign the agreements free of the factor's lien.4" The second
difference is that purchase money chattel mortgages executed by the
borrower are given priority over the factor's lien if recorded within
twenty days after receipt of the merchandise by the borrower. 41 The
significance of these differences together with other problems raised by
the Wisconsin Act will be treated in the ensuing section.
IV. PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE WISCONSIN FACTOR's LIEN LAW
As has been indicated, supra,42 the enactment of the Wisconsin
Factor's Lien Law came on the fiftieth anniversary of the enactment of
the original New York act. In a normal situation, fifty years experience
31 Sec. 241.145 (4).
32Sec. 241.145 (4).13 See. 241.145 (3).
- Sec. 241.145 (2)35 See. 2,41.145 (6)
36 Sec. 241.145 (10).
37 Sec. 241.145 (11).
'8 Comment, 34 MINN. L. REV. 119 (1950).
39 Supra, note 2.
40 Sec. 241.145 (5)
41 Ibid.
42 See section I1.
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with a particular piece of legislation, including legislative refinement
and judicial construction, usually results in a quite workable act, one
whose ambiguities and weaknesses have been thoroughly pointed out
for the wary to avoid and the bold to exploit.
The growth of factoring under the New York act, however, was
not a normal situation due to the fact that factoring in its early years
in New York was carried on by a relatively restricted group of
specialists whose aim it was to remain out of courts and thus keep the
weak act of 1911 from being further weakened by a court whose inem-
bers may not be conversant with commercial practice and who might
take a dim view of factoring.43 Thus the first construction of the
New York act did not come until 1927,4 4 sixteen years after its original
enactment. It is for this reason that, while the act has existed in New
York for fifty years, its judicial construction has been very limited.
An additional reason explaining the lack of authority on this subject
lies in the anomalous history of enactment given to the act by the various
states; for, while the act is a relatively old one as far as New York
goes, it is new as far as the rest of the states are concerned, the second
state to create such legislation being Rhode Island in 1938.4 5 Prior to
1945 only five states had such legislation, but in the next six years,
seventeen states enacted it.48 Thus, while we are not aided by New York
construction due to the policy of the commercial factors there, we can
not be aided by the construction of other states either due to the
comparative newness of the legislation. It is with this background that
the following discussion proceeds.
1. The first general problem posed by the Wisconsin Factor's Lien
Law is: Is this lien a new type of security device or is it merely a refine-
ment of a chattel mortgage to which we can look for aid in construing
the new law? It has been generally held that this is an entirely new
type of security device 4 7 but one court has described it as an "alternative
to a chattel mortgage or a common law pledge," 48 and some writers have
likened it to a field storage warehouse without segregation and
possession," and as coextensive with the conditional sale or chattel
mortgage.50 The act itself is not much aid in its construction. Provision
43 Supra, note 21, at p. 346.
44 Supra, note 21.
45 Chap. 447, GENERtAL LAWS OF RHODE ISLAND (1948).4 6 Supra, note 2.
47 In re H. M. Kouri Corp., 66 F.2d 241, 243 (2d Cir., 1933); In re Merz, 37
F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir., 1930); Colbath v. Mechanics' National Bank, 96 N.H.
112, 70 A.2d 608, 610 (1950) ; Utica Trust Co. v. Decker, 244 N.Y. 340, 346,
155 N.E. 665, 667 (1927).
48 In re Comet Textile Co. 15 F.Supp. 963, 964 (D.C. N.Y., 1936).
49 Supra, note 16.
50.J Francis Ireton, The Proposed Commercial Codes: new Deal in Chattel
Security, 43 ILL. L. REv. 794, 808 (1949).
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is made for liberal construction, 51 but it is not indicated in whose favor
it is to be liberally construed.
2. Another problem raised by the law is as to the type of lien
created. The writers are in disagreement as to whether the lien created
is a floating credit charge.52 At least one court favors this idea.53
3. A third problem posed by the law is: What is the effect of the
Wisconsin Bulk Sales Act5" on the factoring agreement? The Bulk
Sales Law provides for a conclusive presumption of fraud in "the sale,
transfer, or assignment in bulk, otherwise than in the ordinary course
of trade... of any part, or the whole, of any stock of goods, wares, and
merchandise . . ." without the compliance with certain conditions, the
most important of which is notice by the purchaser to the existing
creditors of the vendor, transferor, or assignor, of the proposed sale.
Certain transactions are exempted from the operation of the statute,
(generally sales made pursuant to court order) but a factoring agree-
ment is not so legislatively exempted. However, while there is a
legislative mandate to liberally construe the Factor's Lien Law,55 the
Wisconsin court has held that the Bulk Sales Act is "penal in its
character, in derogation of the common law, and should be strictly
construed."5
The answer to the problem of whether a factoring agreement would
come under the operation of the Bulk Sales Act lies in the answer to
another problem, more specifically, what is a "sale, transfer, or assign-
ment" in bulk under the Wisconsin statutes? The fact that the factoring
agreement covered only a small part of the borrower's merchandise
would have no effect on the operation of the law, since the Wisconsin
act includes sales, transfers, or assignments "of any part" of the
merchandise of the seller.
The Wisconsin court has consistently adhered to its announced rule
of strict construction of the statute ;57 illustratively, the court held58 that
the statute was aimed at the "merchant" as ordinarily defined, and not
at the wide field of people who might deal with property generally con-
sidered merchandise. From this and analogous decisions, it can be
concluded that a factoring agreement entered into with a borrower not a
merchant, as the term is ordinarily defined, would not come within the
51 Sec. 241.145 (12).
52 Stone, The "Equitable Mortgage" in New York, 20 COL. L. REv. 519, 532
(1920), says that a floating credit charge may be created; Dunham, Inventory
and Accounts Receivable Financing, 62 HARV. L. REv. 588, 595 (1949) says
that it may not.
53 Manchester National Bank v. Roche, 186 F.2d 827 (1st Cir., 1951).
Ws. STATS. (1951), sec. 241.18.55 Sec. 241.145 (12).
56 Missos v. Spyros, 182 Wis. 631, 197 N.W: 196 (1924).
57 Ibid.
u Nichols, North, Buse Co. v. Belgium Cannery, 188 Wis. 115, 205 N.W. 804
(1925).
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purview of the Bulk Sales Act. Thus, it is only in those limited situ-
ations where a merchant desires to finance his operations by entering
into a factoring agreement, that the problem of the Bulk Sales Act
would arise.
In continuing this analysis, it must be borne in mind that, while
some disagreement as to what type of a lien the factor receives and
whether it is analogous to any existing security devices has arisen, it is
well settled that the factor does not receive title to the goods and the
agreement is not a sale. Thus, those decisions that include a chattel
mortgage as within the operation of the Bulk Sales Act would be the
most analogous authority for a.similar inclusion of a factoring agree-
ment. Unfortunately, the Wisconsin court has never been faced with the
question of whether a chattel mortgage is within the purview of the act.
However, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Goetz v.
Michael Tauber and Co.,59 in considering the Wisconsin Bulk Sales Act
held that a consignment of goods in bulk by a merchant to a broker to
sell at an auction was not a conveyance within the meaning of the
Bulk Sales Act, stressing the fact that legal title never passed from the
merchant.
The decided weight of authority is to the effect that the giving of a
chattel mortgage on a stock of goods for a bona fide debt or new con-
sideration does not constitute a sale, transfer, or assignment in bulk, in
violation of statutes forbidding such a sale or transfer in bulk of a stock
in trade, otherwise than in the ordinary course of business, without
certain preliminary proceedings"0 The reasoning seems to be that
before the statute becomes applicable, the mortgagor has to divest him-
self completely of all his interest in the property. There is a respectable
minority,61 however, who follow the seemingly more logical reasoning
that if the Bulk Sales Act was intended to prevent a merchant from
disposing of his merchandise in bulk and then absconding with the
proceeds, the evil to be remedied lies both in sales and mortgages and
the law should be applicable to both.
As indicated, the Wisconsin court has not as yet taken its position
on this problem. The one decision considering an analogous problem,
while indicating a reasoning in line with the majority, is of dubious
value. At best, it can be said that the validity of a factor's lien on goods
in the hands of a merchant is questionable unless the Bulk Sales Act is
complied with.
4. Another problem, perhaps of greater magnitude than that arising
by virtue of the operation of the Bulk Sales Act on the factoring agree-
ment, is that arising by virtue of the operation of the federal bankruptcy
59 282 Fed. 869 (7th Cir., 1922).60 Annotations, 9 A.L.R. 473, continued, 14 A.L.R. 753, continued 57 A.L.R. 1049.
61 Ibid.
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laws on the factoring agreement. Under the bankruptcy laws as they
existed from 1938 until 1950, the factor had little protection, for the
factor's lien under the state law terminated on the sale of the merchan-
dise by the borrower in the ordinary course of business. Yet, unless the
factor had a right superior to a purchaser in the ordinary course of
business, if the borrower went bankrupt, the trustee in bankruptcy
could set aside the lien of the factor as a voidable preference if certain
other elements were present. Under the law as it existed, legitimate
security transactions were beclouded by an aura of uncertainty.
2
Agitation soon arose to amend the offending section of the law in favor
of lenders who did non-notification accounts receivable financing and
others.13 The present bankruptcy statute, sec. 60 (a), is the product
of that movement.64
Today, a transfer of property other than real property is perfected
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act at the time when no subse-
quent lien upon such property obtainable by legal or equitable proceed-
ings on a simple contract could become superior to the rights of the
transferee. Thus, the problem presented is, under the Wisconsin
Factor's Lien Law is the lien of the factor superior to that of a lien
obtained by a creditor of the borrower in an action upon a simple
contract f65 An affirmative answer is indicated under the Wisconsin law,
inasmuch as the lender is protected as against all unsecured creditors
and as against subsequent secured creditors. Due to this express pro-
vision of the act, the bankruptcy laws should have little effect on the
validity of the factor's lien.
5. An interesting problem is that raised by the treatment of
accounts receivable in the Wisconsin Act. The law by definition is
restricted to securing the factor by means of a lien on personal property,
and, unless stipulated by the parties to the contrary, also on the proceeds
and accounts receivable arising from the sale or other disposition of
such merchandise. There is no general lien on all accounts receivable.
To include accounts existing at the date of the agreement, or thereafter
arising other than through the sale of merchandise included in the
agreement, the borrower and 'the factor must follow the provisions of
sec. 241.28 of the Wisconsin Statutes relating to assignment of accounts
receivable. This is not required of accounts arising from the sale of
62 Corn Exchange National Bank and Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434, 63
S.Ct. 678, 87 L.Ed. 884 (1943); In re Vardaman Shoe Co., 52 F.Supp. 562(D.C. Mo., 1943); In re Rosen, 157 F.2d 997 (3rd Cir., 1946).
63Kupfer, Progress in the Amendment of 60 (a) . . ,13 L. & CoNraMp. PRoB.
624 (1948).
611 U.S.C. sec. 96.65 McKenzie v. Irving Trust Company, 323 U.S. 365, 369, 69 S.Ct. 405, 89
L.Ed. 305 (1945). "Sec. 60 (a) adopts the state law as the rule of decision
in determining the effectiveness of a transfer as against the trustee."
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merchandise included in the agreement. These accounts are automa-
tically assigned by operation of law.
It is with respect to this latter group of accounts that some doubt has
arisen as to the validity of the factor's lien under the present sec. 60 (a)
of the bankruptcy laws. The argument has been advanced that if the
borrower should sell merchandise included in the factoring agreement
on credit within four months of his bankruptcy, the lien the factor
would receive on the new account receivable arising from the sale would
be a voidable preference, being a transfer of security made within four
months of bankruptcy in consideration of an antecedent debt.66 This
position hardly seems tenable, 'for the transaction more properly should
be regarded as a "value exchange," the factor releasing his lien on the
merchandise sold in consideration of receiving a lien on the new account
given birth to by the sale.
6. The Wisconsin Factor's Lien Law gives the factor a continuing
lien upon all merchandise "generally described" in the written agreement
entered into by the factor and the borrower regardless of whether or
not the merchandise is in possession of the borrower at the time of the
making of the agreement, or even whether it is in existence. It is thus
apparent that any attempt to create a lien by oral agreement would be
void.67 A more difficult problem is that raised by the requirement that
the merchandise be generally described in the written agreement. The
exact particularity of description thus demanded does not seem to be
settled, but a description including the "entire assets of the corporation"
has been held to be too broad."" In mortgages a description of property
now owned or hereafter acquired by the mortgagor is usually sufficient.6 9
Demand for too detailed a description would tend to defeat the purpose
of the act,70 and a suggested correction of this type of act has been to
substitute a description of the location of the articles rather than a
description of the character of articles which are not capable of
description.7 1
If the goods are adequately described in the record notice, the courts
have held that the lien attaches as soon as the goods are acquired, 2 but
there is some feeling that something should be done to subject a par-
ticular lot of goods, merchandise or raw materials to the lien as they
become a part of the buyer's inventory.73 The problem of the effect of
the bankruptcy laws on the imposition of such a lien is present here as it
66 Supra, note 53.
67Lichtenberg v. Harvey, 57 F2d 82 (2d Cir., 1932).
68 Heyman v. Kevorkian, 193 App. Div. 859, 184 N.Y. Supp. 783 (1920).
69 Cohen and Gerber, Mortgages of Merchandise, 39 CoL L. REv. 1338, at 1350
(1939).
70 Supra, note 16 at 771.
Supra, note 50 at 812.
72 Supra, note 48.
73 Supra, note 2 at 604.
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was, supra, in the imposition of the lien on new accounts receivable
arising within four months of bankruptcy of the borrower. It is readily
apparent that, assuming no new consideration is given, if the borrower
acquires merchandise within four months of bankruptcy, the imposition
of a lien on such goods in favor of the factor could be attacked as a
voidable preference under sec. 60 (a). The theory of a "value ex-
change" could not be employed in these transactions as it could in the
accounts receivable problem. However, even if it is set aside as a
voidable preference, the position of the factor is not worsened for it is
only in those situations where the imposition of the new lien could
not be substantiated as a "value exchange," that is, something given in
consideration of receiving the lien, that it could be attacked as a
preference; but having parted with nothing to secure the new lien, the
factor is not hurt if he loses it.
7. Another problem arising under the Wisconsin Act, one which
has its origin, as does the problem of the particularity of the description
of the merchandise required in the record notice, in a lack of legislative
clarity, is the problem as to who is a "purchaser for value in the ordinary
course of business" within the meaning of the act? Nowhere are the
terms included in the phrase defined, yet all three terms, purchaser,
value, and ordinary course of business, present problems which strike
at the very heart of the act.
Who is a purchaser under the act? One taking merchandise as
security? The Uniform Trust Receipts Act and the Uniform Chattel
Mortgage Act both provide such a person is a purchaser though not in
the ordinary course of business. While it does not seem that the power
of sale given the borrower in the act includes the power to borrow
generally on the merchandise or pledge it for his own benefit, the bor-
rower in Wisconsin is given the power to execute chattel mortgages
which have priority over the factor's lien if filed within twenty days of
the receipt of the merchandise by the borrower. 4 The consideration for
such a mortgage can be money or credit extended in the usual course of
business on the strength of a mortgage which is given in payment in
whole or in part of the purchase price of the merchandise. If this is
construed as allowing mere purchase money mortgages, this provision
should be no more objectionable than that which gives dyers and
finishers priority over the factor's lien. 5 It is subject to the criticism,
however, that the factor never knows the status of the inventory, there
being a twenty day gap between the date of the acquisition of the new
merchandise by the borrower and the time when the factor can be sure
his lien is secure. Also, the provision lends itself to the criticism that
it can become a vehicle whereby the factor can lose out altogether; for
4 Sec. 241.145 (5).
7 Sec. 241. 145 (6).
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example, F makes the initial loan and becomes secured by a lien on all
of B's merchandise by virtue of a factoring agreement. Then X makes
a loan to B which B uses to purchase new merchandise to replace
merchandise being sold. X's lien, if filed in time, is superior to that of
F and F may end up with no security at all.
The Wisconsin Act also makes provision whereby the borrower can
sell merchandise in the ordinary course of business and accept con-
ditional sales and chattel mortgages from the purchasers."M In addition,
the borrower can sell or assign the contracts for value in the ordinary
course of business free of the factor's lien. Thus a borrower financing
through factor F can sell merchandise on credit taking back a conditional
sales contract which he can then assign to bank B, the assignment being
free of the factor's lien if made for value. The problems arising under
such an arrangement are as follows: 1) If value means anything other
than cash, it is obvious that factor F may find its collateral dissapated by
the borrower in a perfectlry legitimate manner. Net effect of such a
transaction is to leave no security for the factor. 2) If bank B pays
cash, is such cash "proceeds" within the meaning of subsection two of
the act whereby the factor is given a lien on the proceeds of the sale of
merchandise covered by the factoring agreement? If the borrower sells
the merchandise and takes a chattel mortgage, that is proceeds of the
sale. When he sells the chattel mortgage for cash, there are proceeds of
proceeds. The court may hold the lien doesn't extend to these indirect
proceeds.
It is apparent that the question of what is value takes on great
importance in view of the above provisions. Value in some statutes is
"any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract," including
antecedent indebtedness. This definition is generally accepted commer-
cially.77 However, if the value is not commensurate with the actual
worth of merchandise, it may not be in the usual course of business. 8
The Uniform Trust Receipts Act solves a similar problem by pro-
viding that the buyer in the ordinary course of business must give new
value which does not include "extensions or renewals or existing obli-
gations of the trustee, nor obligations substituted for such existing
obligations," 79 before he can cut off the entrustor's lien. The Uniform
Chattel Mortgage Act excludes purchasers who rely on antecedent debts
from protection given purchasers in the ordinary course.8 0
The problem of what "ordinary course of business" comprehends is
not well settled. The same phraseology is used in the Bulk Sales Act,
but unfortunately it has received no judicial construction. However, the
76Sec. 241.145 (5).
7 Supra, note 38.7SUNIFOR REVIsED SALES AcT, Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 195 (1944).
7 9 UNIFORM TRUsT REcEIPTs Acr, sec. 1, 9 U.L.A. p 6.80 UNIFORM CHATTEL MfORTGAGE Act. sec. 18(2) (a).
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rule seems to be that where it is questioned whether a disputed sale was
one to which such statutes apply, the issue is to be determined in accord-
ance with the showing as to whether the sale was made in the way. in
which a merchant owing debts usually conducts his business or whether
the seller took an unusual method of disposing of his property in order
to secure the consideration for his own benefit thereby leaving his
creditors unpaid.8 ' The same test could be applied to the present statute.
V. CONCLUSION
The Wisconsin Act is not to be overly criticized for its poor drafting
features. Provision is made for foreclosure of the factor's lien, a feature
notably lacking in all other acts.8 2 In addition, the lead given by the
Supreme Court in Benedict v. Ratner 3 has been followed, and pro-
vision has been made whereby the exercise of control by the borrower
over returned merchandise or the failure of the factor to require the
borrower to account for merchandise sold shall not invalidate the fac-
tor's lien, thus abrogating a bankruptcy problem.
The Act in another respect shows the benefit of early New York
experience for provision is made that whei the factor or any third
party on account of the factor shall have possession of goods or mer-
chandise such factor shall have the benefit of the lien provided by the
act without the required filing. 4 In New York it had been held 5 that
under the act as written, if the lendor, who was not a seller, attempted
to enforce a factor's lien based on possession of the liened goods, since
he was not a factor by the common law definition, he could not have a
lien without complying with the notice provisions of the statute.
The above discussion is not intended as a comprehensive review of
all the possible problems that exist or can arise by virtue of this new
legislation. Undoubtedly many of the above suggested problems may
never arise, whereas some not discussed may arise to plague the users
of the Act."6 Only through continued use of the Act will many of the
difficulties herein suggested be resolved.
The use of the factor's lien will not supplant the use of existing
security devices in those situations where they can be safely used. Its
widest use may be expected in financing undercapitalized small business-
men. Due to the relatively poor credit risks the factor will be dealing
with, and the apparent weaknesses in the law as far as the factor is
81 Annotation, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 337 et seq.
82 Supra, note 16 at p. 770 n. 39.
83268 U.S. 353, 361 n. 11, 45 S.Ct. 566, 69 L.Ed. 991 (1925).
84Sec. 241.145 (11).
85 Irving Trust Co. v. B. Linder and Bros., 264 N.Y. 165, 190 N.E. 332 (1934).
86 Steffen and Danziger, supra, note 13, question whether more than one factor
may finance a borrower under this type of act but conclude that this is
possible; Gilmore, supra, note 16, raises the problem of whether or not
agricultural crops may be suitable subjects for factor's loans.
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concerned, it will be incumbent upon him to adequately provide for his
own security in the agreement with the borrower. Assuming this is done
in a workmanlike manner, there seems to be no reason why the factor's
lien should not take its place as a legitimate security device alongside
the conditional sale, the chattel mortgage, and the assignment of accounts
receivable. IRVING W. ZIRBEL
